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Summary: The increase in the concentration of the banking industry across
European Union countries during the last fifteen years can be explained in
terms of: a) global factors, like the comprehensive adoption of technological
innovations, the intensification of competition that has resulted from the de-
regulation of the financial sector and, more recently, as a consequence of the
government interventions and forced acquisitions prompted by the 2007-2009 
financial crisis; and, b) factors that have been specific to the E.U., in particular, 
the structural changes that took place in the region as a result of the creation of
the Single Financial Market (1993) and the introduction of the euro (1999). This
work analyzes the concentration process of the banking industry in the E.U. 
during the last fifteen years giving preeminence to the strategic choices made
by the region’s commercial banks. It also reports the most visible E.U. banks’
M&As and government interventions that resulted from the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis, make a preliminary evaluation of the outcomes, and suggests possible
future trends for the banking industry in the region.
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Industrial concentration is probably the most important attribute of a market structure 
due to its implications over price levels determination, market segmentation and the 
distribution of market share among participating agents (Gilles Burgess Jr. 1989; 
Allen N. Berger, Rebeca S. Demsetz, and Philipe E. Strahan 1999). Concentration is 
usually measured as the cumulative participation (in sales, assets, market share, etc.) 
that corresponds to each incumbent, and is determined by two main factors: a) the 
number of firms in an industry, and b) their relative size (Luigi Zingales and Raghu-
ram G. Rajan 2003).  
However, the measurement of concentration in the banking industry raises 
special problems because one of the attributes that delimit any market is the identifi-
cation of the products and services traded, and due to the significant transformations 
experienced by the banking industry in recent times, particularly in what concerns its 
growingly diversified portfolio of products and services, it has become more difficult 
to delineate its frontiers. For example, there are frequent overlaps between what used 
to be considered traditional activities of commercial banks, and the services offered 
by entities that are not necessarily in the financial business (commercial houses, non-
bank banks, etc.).  
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As a consequence of the complex problem of finding an adequate definition 
for the changing territory of the banking business, and due to the recognition of the 
methodological problems derived from its fast-ongoing diversification, this work 
defines the “banking industry’s participants” as financial intermediaries that accept 
deposits and grant loans, independently of the possibility that they supply other fi-
nancial services to individuals and firms. Based on that ad-hoc delimitation, there is 
abundant statistical evidence that suggests the banking industry in the E.U. member 
countries has become more concentrated during the last fifteen years. While increas-
ing concentration in banking is a trend that has been observed at a global level, dur-
ing the period of reference there were special circumstances that help explain why it 
took place the way it did in the E.U. 
Schematically, the concentration drivers of the E.U.’s banking industry can be 
classified as:  
 
  Global factors, like the comprehensive adoption of technological innova-
tions and the intensification of competition that resulted from extensive in-
ternational deregulation of the financial sector (Kevin Stiroh and Jennifer 
P. Poole 2000);   
  Factors specific to the European Union environment, like the structural 
changes that took place in that region as a result of the creation of the Sin-
gle Financial Market in 1993 and the introduction of the euro in 1999.   
 
The Single Financial Market laid the conditions for an integrated European 
banking industry, while the euro increased the intensity of competition among banks 
by reducing entry barriers, lowering currency risk, eliminating currency conversion 
costs, and reducing costs that affected consumers purchasing services from foreign 
institutions. Both changes reinforced the motivation to create larger institutions, ca-
pable to reap the full benefits of greater economies of scale, urged to become effec-
tive competitors across the E.U. 
In the following sections, this work reviews the increasing concentration of 
the E.U. member countries’ banking industry in more detail, it addresses the most 
relevant large banks’ M&As, and makes a preliminary evaluation of the ex-post per-
formance of such transactions. Last, it presents some conclusions about what the fu-
ture is likely to bring for banking concentration in the E.U. in the wake of the post-
financial- crisis era. 
 
1. Mergers and Acquisitions in the European Financial Sector 
 
M&As have been a preferred choice to respond to the profound transformations that 
are taking place in the global economy across all industries. According to Thomson 
Financial, during the 1990-2001 period there were as many as 76,849 M&As world-
wide (Dean Amel et al. 2004). More than 66% of that total took place between 1996 
and 2001, suggesting an intensification of that kind of transactions. The total value of 
the transactions for the whole period was in the order of 10,531.5 billion dollars, with 
over 85% of that amount concentrated during the latter part of the decade, reinforcing 
the idea that there was an increasing trend in the number and value of M&As.  
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See Table 1 in Appendix. 
 
The M&A activity was especially intense in the financial sector during the 
same period. Over 15,502 financial firms were subject of control takeover transac-
tions involving majority interests from 1990 to 2001. The level of activity increased 
toward the end of the decade for all types of acquisitions: there were 93 deals worth 
more than $1 billion in the six years from 1990 to 1996; but as many as 153 between 
1997 and 1999. Also, the growth in the number of M&As was accompanied by an 
increase in the estimated size of the average transaction: during the last three years of 
the 1990s, a notable rise in the average value of large Financial M&A deals was ob-
served. 
See Table 2 in Appendix. 
 
Both within-industry and cross-industry deals increased between the first and 
the second half of the 1990s, but the great majority of M&As activity was intra-
sector, where the proportion of M&As in the Financial sector in which the targeted 
firm pertained to the banking (i.e. Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies, 
Saving and Loans, Mutual Savings Banks, Credit Institutions, Real Estate; Mortgage 
Bankers and Brokers) represented 79% of the total value and number of transactions. 
When deals were classified by industry of the acquirer, results were similar.  
 
See Table 3 in Appendix. 
 
In recent years, the interpenetration among banks and insurance companies 
has become an undeniable reality of the modern E.U. financial landscape. An in-
creasing number of European banks have combined both, commercial banking and 
insurance services, as part of their core focus. In effect, the term “Bank-Insurance” 
was coined to refer to providers of life insurance and often times damage insurance 
services, through the network of commercial bank’s offices, in apparent contradiction 
with the usually accepted principle of functional specialization. Some of the major 
bank-insurance groups existing today were created, mainly, in the northern countries 
of Europe (e.g., Allianz-Dresdner, Fortis, ING, KBC or Sampo). 
The success of a bank-insurance strategy depends on several factors: the na-
ture of the commercialized products, the importance and proximity of the networks, 
the brand image of different participants and the rationalization of the bank offer 
(George Pujals 2005). However, the future of that strategy is nowadays somewhat 
uncertain after the recently known dismal results of some of the most visible al-
liances forged to provide bank-insurance services (e.g., Allianz-Dresdner or Credit 
Suisse-Whinterhur), and the unexpected and devastating effects of the 2007-2009 
financial crisis. 
Besides the model of Bank-Insurance, other two strategic approaches have 
emerged among European banks in recent years: the “pure-play” Investment Banking 
model and the more traditional Universal Banking model.  
The “pure-players” in investment banking have specialized on counseling, 
capital markets (stocks, interest rates, exchange rates, derivatives) and/or assets man- 
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agement on the account of other institutional investors. While smaller in size and 
subject to the active competition of the American bulge brackets (Goldman Sachs, JP 
Morgan, Morgan Stanley and Merril Lynch)
1, before the financial crisis of 2007-
2009, two European financial institutions had established a critical foot-hold in that 
segment: Deutsche Bank and Crédit Suisse (through its subsidiary Crédit Suisse First 
Boston) and, on a smaller scale, the UBS.  
By contrast, Universal Banks, based on a large constituency in retail banking 
to which proximity is a necessity, combine complementary financial activities, such 
as specialized financial services (for example, consumption credit, assets manage-
ment or insurance services) targeted a customer base composed by particulars and 
SMEs. That model is today dominant in the E.U. as a natural response to strong tur-
bulences of the past because of the diversification benefits that result in more recur-
rent and balanced income, never mind the economic cycle position. It was the British 
banks who first adopted it, followed by the Dutch and, in a smaller scale, by the 
French (Société Génerale and BNP Paribas), which still remain only positioned in a 
limited number of activities.  
 
2. Performance of M&As 
 
Empirical reports are yet inconclusive, but often times corroborate the effectiveness 
of banking M&As to create value. For example, Amel et al. (2004) find that consoli-
dation in the commercial banking and insurance sectors is beneficial to relatively 
small entities in a position to reap economies of scale; but there is little evidence that 
mergers yield economies of scope or gains in managerial efficiency.  
Bank M&As have been analyzed using two basic types of methodology: event 
studies and comparisons of pre-merger and post-merger performance. Event studies 
examine the impact of merger announcements on share prices, but are subject to a 
number of methodological problems, like the possible leakage of information before 
the event may distort share prices’ reaction. The implicit assumption in most event 
studies performed on banking M&As is that “changes in the combined market value 
for the acquiring and the acquired banks, adjusted using a market model for changes 
in the overall stock market evolution, provide an estimate of the anticipated effect of 
M&As on the future profits of the consolidated institutions” (Harry P. Huizinga, J. H. 
M. Nelissen, and Vander R. Vennet 2001).  
Event studies on banks M&As’ effects that have occurred in the U.S. report 
mixed results but, in general, fail to find any significant value increases (Steven Pi-
loff 1996; Simon Kwan and Robert A. Eisenbeis 1999). Based on a sample of 54 
very large European banking M&A deals over the period 1988 to 1997, Alberto Cy-
bo-Ottone and Maurizio Murgia (2000) document that the stock price response of the 
bidder and the target institutions on the M&A announcements are statistically signif-
icant and, while the sample also contains 18 cross-product deals in which banks ex-
                                                        
1 As a consequence of the financial stress generated by the subprime mortgages asset backed securities 
defaults, several of the major investment houses of Wall Street were either acquired, converted into 
commercial banking entities or liquidated (as was the case with Lehman Brothers in mid-September of 
2008).  
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pand into insurance or investment banking, the abnormal returns associated with do-
mestic bank to bank deals are significantly positive on average. Those findings are 
consistent with an efficiency explanation of bank mergers, and the authors suggest 
that the fact that their results differ from those reported for U.S. bank mergers is due 
to the different structure and regulation of E.U. banking markets. 
Huizinga, Nelissen, and Vennet (2001) analyze the efficiency effects of 52 ho-
rizontal bank mergers over the period 1994-1998, (the period immediately preceding 
the creation of the EMU), in several E.U. member countries, and find evidence of 
“substantial unexploited scale economies in banking across different institutional 
types of credit institutions, also for the largest banks.” They attribute their findings 
the capability to largely explain the substantial consolidation recorded among small 
and medium sized banks, especially in Germany and Italy, over the 1990s decade. 
In the year 2000, the European Central Bank polled bankers about their moti-
vations to engage in mergers and acquisitions from an industry perspective and pub-
lished an interesting document that presented the main findings (either as a result of 
interviews or reflecting the knowledge of the supervisors; European Central Bank – 
ECB 2000). The report classified motivations to engage in banking M&As along two 
dimensions: a) same industry vs. different industry; and b) same country vs. different 
country, resulting in four different possible combinations (ECB 2000). Based on 
those results it became rather obvious that the most prevalent argument to contem-
plate the strategic alternative of an M&A among European bankers was the pursuit of 
increased profitability (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan 1999). In general, cost benefits 
from economies of scale were expected in domestic bank M&As. However, accord-
ing to Pujals (2005), preliminary estimations of expected synergies are always too 
optimistic. 
 
See Table 4 in Appendix. 
 
Compared to the expected synergies, those effectively captured were, very 
likely, much different. However, this is not a situation that could be considered par-
ticular to the banking industry but, on the contrary, it is a generalized phenomenon. 
During a takeover contest the buyer usually boasts about large potential synergies 
and cost reductions to be obtained from the target, in order to justify usually high 
premiums paid for an acquisition. Also, given the long term nature of the expected 
synergies calculations, it is highly likely that the long term projections on which they 
were based during the first years of the century were significantly affected by the 
financial turbulence and economic slowdown of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
Yener Altunbas and David Márquez (2008) examined the impact of European 
Union banks’ strategic similarities on post-merger performance and found that bank 
mergers have resulted in improved performance. Other interesting findings of those 
authors include the fact that for domestic deals, it can be quite costly to integrate in-
stitutions due to important asymmetries in terms of their loan, earnings, costs, depo-
sits and size strategies. In the case of cross-border mergers, they found that differ-
ences between merging partners in their loan and credit risk strategies are conducive 
to improved performance. By contrast, differences in their capital and cost structure 
has a negative impact on their performance.  
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In still another study with the same underlying objective of evaluation the 
post-merger performance of participating entities, but this time using event study 
methodology, Ioannis Asimakopoulos and Panayiotis P. Athanasoglou (2009) ex-
amined the value creation of M&A deals in European Banking from 1990-2004. 
Their study examined the stock price reaction to the announcement of bank M&A 
deals, and analyzed the determinants of that reaction. The findings of that study sup-
port the conclusion that there was evidence of value creation in those acquisitions as 
the shareholders of the targets benefited from positive and (statistically) significant 
abnormal returns, while those of the acquirers earned small negative, but non-
significant abnormal returns. Shareholders of the acquirers, domestic M&As and es-
pecially those between banks with shares listed on the stock market, were apparently 
more benefited compared to shareholders of cross-border transactions, or those cases 
when the target was unlisted. It is interesting to notice that shareholders of the targets 
earned in all cases positive abnormal returns. Although the link between abnormal 
returns and fundamental characteristics of the banks was rather weak, it appeared that 
the acquisition of smaller, less efficient banks generating more diversified income 
were more value creating, while the acquisitions of less efficient, liquid and characte-
rized by higher credit risk banks were not value creating transactions. 
 
3. Consolidation of the European Union Banking Industry 
 
Consolidation of the European Union banking industry during the 1990s took place 
mainly at the domestic level, including a large number of securities and insurance 
companies’ M&As. More recently, during a second stage of consolidation that 
started after the adoption of the euro, there was a marginal reorientation of that trend 
towards cross-border transactions. As a consequence of domestic consolidation, sev-
eral “national champions” were created. Such was the case of, for example, BSCH 
and BBVA in Spain, Banca Intesa, Unicredito and Sao Paolo IMI in Italy; BHV in 
Germany or BNP Paribas and Crédit Agricole-Crédit Lyonnais in France.  
 
See Table 5 in Appendix. 
 
During the 1990s there was a significant preference for domestic targets 
among large banking groups M&As. According to a report published by the Bank of 
International Settlements (cited by David Marques-Ibanez and Phil Molyneux 2002), 
national consolidation was more popular among European banks because it was less 
difficult to merge more homogeneous corporate cultures. It could also be argued that 
European financial firms first tried to gain size and strengthen their balance sheet to 
achieve a stronger national presence in preparation towards international competi-
tion.  
 
See Figure 1 in Appendix. 
 
In more than one sense, domestic consolidation contradicted the expectations 
of a more dynamic cross-border M&A activity resulting from the creation of the Sin-
gle Financial Market (1993) and the adoption of the euro (1999), since the elimina- 
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tion of protectionist barriers to financial services providers among E.U. members 
represented an extraordinary opportunity to enter new markets and achieve important 
economies of scale, not to mention the benefits associated with geographical and 
economic sector diversification.  
In terms of national industry concentration, the average percentage of the 
banking and credit sector controlled by the five larger banks, measured in terms of 
total assets, rose from an average of 37.9% in 1980 to 57.1% in 1999. For almost all 
of the smaller countries, the top five banks held more than 50% of the banking assets. 
However, in a few countries, the concentration was even more pronounced, like in 
the case of Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium, where the percentage of 
assets held among the five largest banks exceeded 75%.  
By contrast, in the U.K., Luxembourg, and Germany that measure was below 
30%. The four largest E.U. economies had comparatively less concentrated banking 
sectors; e.g., Germany had the lowest level of concentration in the euro area with 
only 18.95%; Italy, with 38.7%, was closely followed by France, 42.70; while Spain 
was comparatively more concentrated, with 51.90%. 
 
See Table 6 in Appendix. 
 
A Herfindahl Index analysis shows that significantly large concentration in-
creases were observed in the cases of Austria (from 0.036 to 0.1016 between 1990 
and 1999), Spain (from 0.0373 to 0.0716 between 1985 and 1999) and Italy (from 
0.0161 to 0.0600 between 1985 and 1999). However, in the case of Greece important 
marginal reductions were recorded from 0.2469 to 0.1513, between 1985 and 1999. 
 
See Table 7 in Appendix. 
 
While concentration increased consistently in most E.U. member countries, 
banks were shy to try their chances beyond their national borders. Except for a few 
notable cases, just before the 2007 financial crisis, most banking cross-border M&As 
in the E.U. were limited in size and geographical outreach, confined to regions with 
strong historical and cultural relationships.  
 
See Table 8 in Appendix. 
 
Cross-border consolidation was slower than expected due to legal differences, 
cultural complexity, insufficient understanding of other national markets, etc. Also, 
in some cases there was a notable opposition from governments and authorities to a 
faster and more decided consolidation. Some of the attempts of cross-border acquisi-
tion were frustrated by a veiled intervention of national authorities, apparently unwil-
ling to see their national banks taken-over by foreign institutions (e.g. ABM Amro 
(Netherlands) and BBVA (Spain) to acquire a couple of Italian medium sized 
banks)
2. Except for such isolated cases, before the full outburst of the 2007-2009 fi-
                                                        
2 A case in which foreign banks faced tough resistance to increase their share of the Italian domestic 
market from the Italian authorities.  
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nancial crisis there was an increasingly clear tendency among the largest E.U. players 
to deploy new strategies oriented towards building truly pan-European institutions.  
The last highly visible attempt to build a truly pan-European institution before 
the financial crisis took place in October 2007, with the historical acquisition of one 
of the largest European banks, the Dutch ABN Amro, by a consortium integrated by 
the Royal Bank of Scotland (U.K.), Fortis (Benelux) and Santander (Spain). Among 
the first large-scale cross-border banking acquisitions, that transaction was extraordi-
nary, not only because of its sheer size (more than 100 billion dollars were paid by 
the consortium after a bitter six-month takeover battle with Barclays-from the U.K.), 
but also because two of the three acquirers
3 who shared the spoils of the former bank, 
fell in serious financial distress during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Royal Bank of 
Scotland was eventually bailed-out by the British government, that became its major-
ity shareholder; and Fortis went bankrupt and was liquidated to different interested 
parties. 
 
4. E.U. Financial Institutions Affected by the 2007-2009 
Financial Crisis, Their Governments’ Intervention, Restructuring 
Processes and Effects on the Region’s Banking Industry 
Concentration 
 
Towards the last months of 2007 there were unequivocal signals of a worsening cre-
dit-crunch originated by the Subprime Mortgages defaults in the U.S. that soon con-
taminated other countries and would become the worst international financial crisis 
since the 1930s.  
As market participants realized that many Asset Backed Securities (ABSs) and 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) contained in the portfolios of the largest 
E.U.’s financial institutions were among the defaulting securities, uncertainty genera-
lized. Between the first months of 2008 and the end of 2009, many E.U. financial 
institutions were forced to recognize significant losses and were subject to drastic 
reorganizations. Some were acquired by competitors, others broken-up and sold to 
the highest bidders; and some others nationalized. This was not a localized event; 
subprime mortgage-backed securities generated losses in practically all major Euro-
pean Union nations’ large financial institutions. Since a detailed analysis of that epi-
sode would be a daunting task, in what follows we focus on the largest and most vis-
ible banking firms casualties of the subprime mortgages crisis in Europe, and discuss 
how they had a bearing on the E.U.’s banking industry concentration.  
The U.K. experienced its first bank run in over 100 years when one of its larg-
est mortgage banks, Northern Rock, encountered funding problems in rolling over its 
short-term debt during September 2007. Originally a building society, it was demu-
tualised in 1997 to become a public limited company. Adoption of the mortgages 
securitization business model increased its dependence on the wholesale market for 
funding so, by the time the subprime mortgages crisis produced a severe liquidity 
                                                        
3 The winning consortium was integrated by the Royal Bank of Scotland (a U.K. bank and leader of the 
takeover initiative), Fortis (mainly based in the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg), and Santander 
Central Hispano (Spain).    
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squeeze, Northern Rock was highly vulnerable. On February 18, 2008, after a se-
quence of extremely difficult circumstances, the bank became the first institution to 
be nationalized in the U.K. since the 1970s (Sonia Ondo-Ndong and Laurence Scia-
lom 2008). 
The spring and summer months of 2008 were plagued with bad news about 
failing or bailed out financial institutions of the U.S. (Bear Stearns, Freddie Mac, 
Fannie Mae, AIG, etc.) and as a natural consequence of their intricate network of 
business relations with European Union financial institutions, the latter were soon 
infected too. In July of 2008, the Danish Central Bank announced the intervention of 
Roskilde Bank. One month later, when the efforts to find a buyer that could inject 
fresh capital in the bank failed, the Central Bank of Denmark announced it would 
buy Roskilde (RTVE 2008a). 
The period of worse financial turbulence for the E.U. financial markets was 
during September. That month, Lloyds was forced to take over the control of the Ha-
lifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) in a transaction of 12.2 billion sterling pounds. Brit-
ish authorities had significant interest
4 in that transaction which created a mammoth 
entity with control over one third of the mortgages and savings market of the U.K., 
and forced the government to modify its antimonopoly legislation to allow the mer-
ger because, according to the Minister of Finance, it was “absolutely necessary” 
(RTVE 2008b).  
On September 28, the U.K. government announced the nationalization of 
Bradford & Bingley, a large mortgage bank whose stock price had lost 90% of its 
value since January, with 2.5 million customers and 22 billion pounds in deposits. A 
few hours after that announcement, the Spanish bank Santander announced it would 
buy the 197 branches of B&B in the UK, along with its mortgages portfolio, worth 
approximately 41 billion sterling pounds (RTVE 2008c). The next day, the German 
government announced the bailout of Hypo Real Estate. Hypo was under the threat 
of bankruptcy, so the government coordinated an emergency 15 billion euro capital 
injection from a group of private banks, including the government’s collateral for 35 
billion euro. On the same day, the governments of Belgium, Holland and Luxem-
bourg announced the nationalization of Fortis bank, through a joint investment of 
11.2 billion euro that represented 49% of the equity of the bank’s operations in each 
one of those countries
5. The nationalization agreement contemplated that the assets 
Fortis acquired from ABN Amro the previous year would be transferred to the Dutch 
bank ING (RTVE 2008d; Roberto Santillán-Salgado 2009). By September 30, the 
governments of Belgium, France and Luxembourg announced the rescue of the fi-
nancial group Dexia, with an injection of fresh capital for 6.4 billion euro (RTVE 
2008e). On October 6, the German government made a new announcement, this time 
it was the second bailout of Hypo Real Estate. The first bailout attempt had failed 
when the financing needs of the company were made public and it was evident that 
more resources than originally estimated were needed. The German government and 
                                                        
4 HBOS was at the brink of bankruptcy and its takeover by Lloyds was seen as a second-best solution by 
the UK government. 
5 The Belgian government contributed 4.7 billion, the Dutch government 4 billion and the government of 
Luxembourg, 2.5.  
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several private banks put together a support package worth 50 billion euro to keep 
Hypo Real Estate afloat.  
That alarming sequence of emergencies prompted European governments to 
search for a better coordination mechanism that allowed them tackling with the ef-
fects of the defaulting subprime asset-backed securities and, during the weekend of 
October 4, 2008, the leaders of Europe’s largest economies (the U.K., France, Ger-
many and Italy) announced they had agreed “to work together to support financial 
institutions-but without forming a joint bail-out fund”. Before the meeting, Germany 
had expressed its opposition to any concerted bail-out plan, even when that view 
seemed in conflict with the position of the International Monetary Fund President, 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, who had advocated for a coordinated bailout action (BBC 
News 2008).  
The following week, U.K. government officials made public one of the broad-
est bailout plans of the financial crisis, consisting of massive investments in several 
of the country's largest financial institutions in an effort to recapitalize the industry, 
end concerns about the viability of individual institutions and encourage banks to 
resume lending to consumers and businesses. 
The plan would consist in an injection of capital through the acquisition of up 
to £50 billion in preferred stocks, plus a guarantee of around £250 billion for bonds 
issued by the banks, and additional liquidity of at least £200 billion through the Bank 
of England's Special Liquidity Scheme. The Treasury of the UK said that eight banks 
- Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC, Barclays PLC, the soon-to-be-combined 
HBOS PLC and Lloyds TSB Group PLC, Abbey National PLC, Nationwide Build-
ing Society, Standard Chartered PLC and HSBC Holdings PLC - could draw on an 
aggregate sum of £25 billion in order to boost their Tier 1 capital, a measure of capi-
tal against risky assets. 
The British plan was sharply contrasting with the U.S. Toxic Assets Rescue 
Program, with its $700 billion financial-markets bailout fund. While the U.S. pro-
gram was aimed at taking toxic assets off the banks' balance sheets, the U.K. plan 
was aimed at boosting banks' capital, so they could restart lending. While the British 
government took a significant stake in its national banks through the purchase of pre-
ferred stock, it didn’t acquire voting rights or an active, day-to-day managerial role. 
However, since that moment, it established a set of conditions that institutions bene-
fited with government resources should observe, including restrictions to dividend 
policy, executive compensation and full commitment to support lending to small 
businesses and home buyers (Wall Street Journal 2008). 
The global financial markets were less turbulent in October, but witnessed 
highly unusual events. One of the most dramatic episodes was the nationalization of 
Iceland’s three largest banks Kaupthing bank, Glitnir bank and Landsbanki, in a mat-
ter of only three days (between the 7
th and the 9
th of that month), after the massive 
demission of their top executives (RTVE 2008f). On the 19
th, the Dutch government 
announced an injection of 10 billion euros to the capital of ING, after significant 
losses throughout the year (RTVE 2008g). Also, during that month, the Swiss gov-
ernment bailed out United Bank Suisse (UBS), that country’s largest commercial 
bank, and urgently renegotiated the capitalization standards for Credit Suisse, its  
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second largest bank (RTVE 2008h). Finally, on the 27
th, the Belgian government 
announced the bailout of KBC, with an injection of 3.5 billion euro.  
When analyzed in retrospective, one can conclude that the events that took 
place during the last months of 2008 paved the road for a coordinated and in-depth 
revision of the world financial markets’ regulations and mechanisms. There were 
rumors of the intention to implement supra-national regulations in order to achieve 
homogeneity and preclude what the experts named as “regulatory arbitrage”. How-
ever, while numerous statements referred to the need of achieving an encompassing 
and strict regulation for the industry, the process remained more local and focused on 
the specificities of national markets. 
The April 2009 Global Financial Stability Report published by the IMF sur-
prised markets’ participants not only by announcing that the estimate of total bad 
assets outstanding in the global financial markets was in the order of $4,1 trillion 
(almost certainly to be revised upwards), but by the much more shocking announce-
ment that most of the losses belonged to European, and not to the U. S. banks. Ac-
cording to the IMF’s report, the global banking system accounted for $2.8 trillion of 
bad assets and of that, over half, $1.4 trillion, corresponded to European banks vs. 
only $1.0 trillion for US banks (International Monetary Fund 2009). The mere recog-
nition that European banks and other financial institutions had been the worst af-
fected by the financial crisis propelled a number of new regulatory initiatives both at 
the national and pan-European levels.   
One of the first signals that European regulators had taken the initiative to ex-
ercise greater control over their larger financial institutions was the October 2009 
official announcement that ING, one of the E.U.’s largest financial groups, would 
undergo a break-up imposed by the European Commission. ING’s financial services 
group was forced to sell its insurance and investment management business, and fo-
cus only on banking to meet the European regulator’s conditions (Financial Times 
2009). ING was also forced to sell ING Direct USA, its US banking arm. As a con-
sequence, ING’s balance was reduced by approximately 45%. Before the break up, 
ING was the 7
th largest firm of the Fortune Global 500 in 2008, was a leader in the 
on-line banking segment, and served 85 million individual customers, firms and in-
stitutions in more than 50 countries
6. The financial crisis and the commitment of ING 
to participate in the bailout of the Dutch-Belgian Fortis, which represented a large 
cash disbursement, limited its equity base and put it in a serious condition that re-
quired an injection of government resources. Such a harsh measure was significantly 
more than the market was used to and was, no doubt, one of the toughest interven-
tions of the European competition authorities ever (Financial Times 2009). At the 
time of ING’s announcement, and presumably correlated to it, Royal Bank of Scot-
land was already working on a government-backed plan to sell its 312 RBS-branded 
branches in England and Wales, and Lloyds was likely to have reduced its share of 
current accounts by 5%. 
 
                                                        
6 One of its divisions, ING Insurance, served more than 44 million customers in America (US, Canada, 
Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Argentina, Uruguay and Colombia), where it had significant activity in the 
pension funds industry, largely developed during the last two decades in the region.  
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The extremely high costs that resulted for both, private investors and national 
governments, represented very strong arguments to for the supporters of the need to 
reinforce the regulations that apply to the E.U. financial markets, which are likely to 
influence concentration of the industry, although it is not possible to be certain about 
what will the final effects will be because it will all depend on the depth and breadth 




The European banking industry experienced an unprecedented wave of domestic 
M&As during the 1990s, with increasing intensity in the period that goes from 1997 
to 2000. In the following four years, there was a loss of dynamism as a result an eco-
nomic slowdown. However, between 2004 and 2007 there was renewed impetus with 
numerous cross border transactions that suggested the restructuring of the European 
landscape was far from finished and with clearer preference for cross-border acquisi-
tions. However, the 2007-2009 crisis brought devastating effects for a number of the 
E.U.’s largest financial institutions. While it still is too soon to evaluate its long-term 
consequences, in the short-run it has affected the ownership and control of many im-
portant players in the region. In many case it has too artificially imposed on them a 
restructuring and redeployment of assets. However, while the crisis is expected to 
slow down the trend of increasing banking industry concentration temporarily, the 
main impetus will, very likely, continue in the coming years.  
There are good arguments to defend the idea that a full-fledged economic un-
ification should count with a pan-European banking system (i.e., an accentuation of 
cross-border competition at the level of retail operations in domestic markets), capa-
ble of offering many more products and services choices to the firms and consumers 
of the E.U. member countries.  
However, it seems that precisely that kind of retail operations offer the highest 
barriers to entry and, as a consequence, present the lowest participation of foreign 
banks. The weak penetration of foreign banks in the domestic markets of the E.U. 
countries should motivate a more objective deregulation to reduce barriers to entry.  
Finally, the low interest of foreign banks in the domestic markets of their 
neighboring countries is possibly explained by their relative saturation, with the only 
exception of Italy. But in addition to the “economic” barriers to entry, it is highly 
likely that there are other barriers to entry of a social and cultural nature, although 
less obvious and, most likely, more difficult to measure. 
The construction of truly pan-E.U. banks should eliminate arbitrage opportuni-
ties and level off the cost of financial services to the citizens of all E.U. citizens. 
While cross-border competition has improved their access to a more diversified port-
folio of services and financial products, cross-border integration should bring about 
significant economies of scale and scope, reducing costs and improving efficiency in 
the system. A more stable international environment and the recovery of economic 
growth should facilitate a process that, most certainly, will not be easy. 
 
  
257  Banking Concentration in the European Union during the Last Fifteen Years 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 2, pp. 245-266
References  
 
Altunbas, Yener, and David Márquez. 2008. "Mergers and Acquisitions and Bank 
Performance in Europe: The Role of Strategic Similarities." Journal of Economics and 
Business, 60(3): 202-224. 
Amel, Dean, Collen Barnes, Fabio Panneta, and Carmelo Salleo. 2004. "Consolidation and 
Efficiency in the Financial Sector: A Review of the International Evidence." Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 28(10): 2493-2519. 
Asimakopoulos, Ioannis, and Panayiotis P. Athanasoglou. 2009. "Revisiting the Merger 
and Acquisition Performance of European Banks." Bank of Greece Working Paper 
100. 
BBC News. 2008. No Banks Bail-Out for Europe. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7648249.stm1 (accessed November 15, 2008). 
Belaisch, Agnès, Laura Kodres, Joaquim Levy, and Angel Ubide. 2001. "Euro-Area 
Banking at the Crossroads." International Monetary Fund Working Paper 28/01. 
Berger, Allen N., Rebeca S. Demsetz, and Philipe E. Strahan. 1999. "The Consolidation of 
the Financial Services Industry: Causes, Consequences and Implications for the 
Future.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 23(2-4): 135-194. 
Burgess Jr., Gilles H. 1989. Industrial Organization. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall. 
Cybo-Ottone, Alberto, and Maurizio Murguia. 2000. “Mergers and Shareholder Wealth in 
European Banking.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 24(6): 831-859. 
European Central Bank. 2000. Mergers and Acquisitions Involving European Banking 
Industry: Facts and Implications. Frankfurt am Main: European Central Bank. 
Huizinga, Harry P., J. H. M. Nelissen, and Vander R. Vennet. 2001. "Efficiency Effect of 
Bank Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe." Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 
2001-088/3.  
International Monetary Fund. 2009. Global Financial Stability Report. Washington: 
International Monetary Fund. 
Kwan, Simon, and Robert A. Eisenbeis. 1999. "Mergers of Publicly Traded Banking 
Organizations Revisited." Economic Review of the Federal Reserve Bank, Fourth 
Quarter: 26-37. 
Marques-Ibanez, David, and Phil Molyneux. 2002. “Financial Restructuring in European 
Banking and Foreign Expansion." Latin American Business Review, 3(4): 19-57. 
Ondo-Ndong, Sonia, and Laurence Scialom. 2008. "Northern Rock: The Anatomy of a 
Crisis." Université Paris X-Nanterrey Working Paper 2008-23. 
Piloff, Steven J. 1996. "Performance Changes and Shareholder Wealth Creation Associated 
with Mergers of Publicly Traded Banking Institutions." Journal of Money, Credit, and 
Banking, 28(2): 294-310. 
Pujals, George. 2005. “L’Europe Bancaire en Movement!” Revue d'Economie Financiere, 
78: 19-47. 
RTVE. 2008a. Cronología de los rescated de los bancos europeos en apuros por la crisis 
financier. http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20081005/cronologia-los-rescates-los-bancos-
europeos-apuros-por-crisis-financiera/172068.shtml (accessed January 23, 2011). 
RTVE. 2008b. Lloyds TSB desembolsa 15.300 millones de euros para salvar al Halifax Bank 
of Scotland.
 http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20080917/lloyds-tsb-desembolsa-15300- 
258  Roberto J. Santillán Salgado 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 2, pp. 245-266 
milllones-euros-para-salvar-halifax-bank-scotland/158325.shtml (accessed January 23, 
2011). 
RTVE. 2008c. El Gobierno del Reino Unido nacionalizará el banco Bradford&Bingley. 
http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20080928/gobierno-del-reino-unido-nacionalizara-banco-
bradford-bingley/166108.shtml (accessed January 23, 2011). 
RTVE. 2008d. El banco belgaçholandés Fortis recibirá 11.200 millones de fondos públicos 
para sortear la crisis. http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20080928/banco-belga-holandes-
fortis-recibira-11200-millones-fondos-publicos-para-sortear-crisis/166469.shtml 
(accessed January 23, 2011). 
RTVE. 2008e. Bélgica, Francia y Luxemburgo inyeactan 6ç400 millones de euros para salvar 
a Dexia. http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20080930/belgica-francia-luxemburgo-inyectan-
6400-millones-euros-para-salvar-dexia/167648.shtml (accessed January 23, 2011). 
RTVE. 2008f. Islandia nacionaliza los tres principales bancos del país en tres días. 
http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20081009/islandia-nacionaliza-los-tres-principales-bancos-
del-pais-tres-dias/174997.shtml (accessed January 23, 2011). 
RTVE. 2008g. Holanda inyectará 10.000 millones en el banco ING para salvarlo de las 
pérdidas. http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20081019/holanda-acuerda-plan-rescate-para-
banco-ing/180049.shtml (accessed January 23, 2011). 
RTVE. 2008h. El Gobierno suizo sale en auxilio del banco UBS e inyecta 3.700 millones de 
euros a la entidad. http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20081016/gobierno-suizo-sale-auxilio-
del-banco-ubs-inyecta-3700-millones-euros-entidad/178850.shtml (accessed January 
23, 2011). 
RTVE. 2008i. El Gobierno belga inyecta 2ç500 millones de euros en el banco KBC después 
de Fortis y Dexia. http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20081027/gobierno-belga-inyecta-3500-
millones-euros-banco-kbc-despues-fortis-dexia/184296.shtml (accessed January 23, 
2011). 
Santillán-Salgado, Roberto J. 2008. "Consolidation of the Banking Industry in Europe: The 
Case of ABN-Amro." In European and Latin American-Caribbean Strategic 
Partnerships: Unleashing the Potential, ed. Jacobo Ramírez. Mumbai: McMillan. 
Steen, Michael. 2009. “ING to be Broken up in the Wake of Bail-Out.” Financial Times. 
October 26, 2009. 
Stiroh, Kevin J., and Jennifer P. Poole. 2000. "Explaining the Rising Concentration of 
Banking Assets in the 1990s." Current Issues in Economics and Finance, 6(9): 1-6. 
Wall Street Journal. 2008. UK to Buy into Large Banks in Bold Move. http://www.wealth-
bulletin.com/home/content/2452102038/ (accessed November 15, 2008). 
Zingales, Luigi, and Raghuram G. Rajan. 2003. "Banks and Markets: The Changing 
Character of European Finance." Paper presented at the European Central Bank 2
nd 









259  Banking Concentration in the European Union during the Last Fifteen Years 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 2, pp. 245-266
Appendix 
 
Table 1   Number and Value of Mergers and Acquisitions Worldwide, 1990-2001 
 
  1990-1995 1996-2001 
  Number $  Billions  Number $  Billions 
Australia 136  4.5  268.0  25.20 
Belgium 67  4.5  70.0  32.90 
Canada 156  3.9  321.0  36.00 
France 314  25.5  227.0  73.70 
Germany 234  11.0  379.0  82.60 
Italy 251  24.8  236.0  97.60 
Japan 46  45.4  491.0  138.10 
Netherland 123  14.5  88.0  33.90 
Spain 120  8.3  153.0  34.20 
Sweden 84  4.1  21.2  38.00 
Switzerland 111  4.9  87.0  35.20 
UK 386  41.4  750.0  226.10 
USA 2,341  205.3  2,902.0  1,138.20 
Industrial countries*:  4,369  398.2  6,053.0  1,974.90 
Euro area:  1,317  99.8  1,406.0  412.30 
World 5,725  460.9  9,777.0  2,232.90 
 
Note: *G10 countries, Australia and Spain. 





Table 2   Annual Number and Value of M&As Involving a Financial Firm as the Target, That had  
a Reported Value of at Least  
 
  USD 1 billion (1991-1999) 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number  10  6  11 14 23 21 49 58 46 
Value   22.1  12.4  39.7  23.7  113  59  233  431  291 
Average  value  2.21 2.07 3.61 1.69  4.913  2.81 4.76 7.43 6.33 
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Table 3   Number and Value of Mergers and Acquisitions of Banks and Insurance Companies  
Worldwide, by Sub-periods: 1990-1995 and 1996-2001 
 
  Banks**  Insurance companies ** 
  1990-1995 1996-2001 1990-1995 1996-2001 
  Num.  $ Bn.  Num.  $ Bn.  Num.  $ Bn.  Num.  $ Bn. 
Australia  53  2.4 91  13.2 23  1.1 22  3.3 
Belgium  21  0.8 34  28.1 18  2.7 12  1.0 
Canada  52  1.6  112  15.0 19  0.9 42  8.8 
France  148  11.8 96  44.6 21  2.9 42  21.0 
Germany  123  2.4  229  68.6 39  6.2 46  12.7 
Italy  147 19.2  138 80.4  33  4.9  44 13.4 
Japan  29 19.2  236  119.1  2  0.2  48 15.3 
Nether.  36  44.4 24  5.9 38  3.3 22  21.9 
Spain  66  10.9 67  31.2 35  2.3 42  1.1 
Sweden  44 5.9  17 6.0  7  81  3 2.7 
Switzer.  81  2.8 43  24.2  9  1.2 14  9.7 
UK  140  3.3 27  114.4 77  2.0  141  76.0 
USA  1691 156.6  1796 754.9  275  25.6  364 192.5 
Indust.  count.*  2631  295.1  3183  1317.0 596  53.3 845  379.4 
Euro  area  655  59.6 700  302.8 227  24.1 249  79.2 
World  3363  340.3 4781  1495.0  773  62.1 1328  418.7 
 
Note:  *G10 countries, Australia and Spain.  
  **The sectors refer to that of the target. 
Source: Own elaboration, using data reported by Amel et al. (2002). 
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Table 4   Expected Synergies from Recent Years Banking M&As in the European Union 
 






SCH/Abbey 2004  560  20  80 
Crédit Agricole-Crédit Lyonnais  2002  760  0  100 
Caisses d'Epargne-CDC IXIS  2001  500  85  15 
Allianz-Dresdner 2001  1,080  88  12 
Halifax-Bank of Scotland  2001  1,113  51  49 
Dexia-Artesia 2001  200  15  85 
HBV-Bank of Austria  2000  500  0  100 
RBoS-Natwest 2000  2,335  17  83 
BNP-Paribas 1999  850  18  82 
BBV-Argentaria 1999  511  0  100 
Intesa-Comit 1999  1,000  50  50 
Banco Santander-BCH  1999  630  0  100 
 
Source: Pujals (2005) and own elaboration. 
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Table 5   Domestic Mergers and Acquisitions Among Large European Union Countries’ Banking 
Groups during the 1990s 
 
Country Banking  group 
Spain  BSCH (Santander + Central Hispano + Banesto) 
BBVA (Bilbao Vizcaya/Argentaria) 
Austria  Bank Austria (Bank Austria + Creditanstalt) 
Erste Bank (Giro Credit + Erste SparCasse) 
Italy  SanPaolo IMI (I.B. SanPaolo di Torino + IMI) 
Banca Intesa (Banco Ambrosiano Veneto + Cariplo + CPP) + BCI;  
Unicredito Italiano (Credito Italiano + Unicredito) 
Germany HypoVereinsbank  (Bayerische Vercinbsbank + HypoBank); 
Deutsche Bank + Bankers Trust 
France  BNP-Paribas (BNP + Paribas); Banque Populaires + Natexis 
Crédit Mutuel + CIC; Caisse d'Epargne + Crédit Foncier 
Société Générale + Crédit du Nord; 
Crédit Agricole + Banque Sofinco + Banque Indosuez 
Portugal  Banco Comercial Portugues + Banco Portugues do Atlantico; 
Caixa Peral de Depositos + Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor 
Belgium  KBC (Kredietbank + Cera); Bacob + Artesia Bank 
Netherlands  ABN-Amro (ABN + Amro) 
Denmark  Unibank (Unibank + Tryg-Baltica) 
Alliances/ minority 
stakes  
BSCH-Royal Bank of Scotland-SanPaoloIMI-SG-Commerzbank-
Champlimaud 
Crédit Agricole-Crédit Lyonnais-Banca Intesa 
BBVA-Banco di Napoli-BNI-Créedit Lyonnais 
ABN-Amro-Banca di Roma 
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Source: Own elaboration, with data from the European Central Bank (European Central Bank 2000). 
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Table 6   Assets of Five Largest Credit Institutions as a Percentage of Total Assets, 1980-1999 
 
  1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
AT  35.9 34.7 39.2 39.0 48.3 50.1 50.40
BE  54.0 48.0 48.0 51.2 52.2 53.9 72.5 77.40
DE  13.9 16.7 16.1 16.7 19.2 19.00
DK  62.0 61.0 76.0 72.0 72.0 72.0 76.0 77.00
ES  35.1 34.9 47.3 46.0 45.2 44.6 51.90
FI  37.0 38.0 41.0 70.6 71.7 72.7 73.5 74.30
FR  46.0 42.5 41.3 41.2 38.0 39.2 42.70
GR  80.6 83.7 75.7 74.5 71.8 72.8 76.60
IE  59.1 47.5 44.2 44.4 42.2 40.7 40.1 40.80
IT  29.2 36.4 32.1 30.7 38.7 48.30
LU  31.1 26.8 21.2 21.8 22.4 24.6 26.10
NL  72.9 73.4 76.1 75.4 79.4 81.7 82.30
PT  60.0 61.0 58.0 74.0 80.0 76.0 75.2 72.60
SE  80.8 82.7 86.5 86.5 86.8 85.7 88.20
UK     28.3 28.3 29.1 28.3 27.8 29.07
Average  37.9 52.8 50.9 51.8 52.0 52.2 54.8 57.10
 
Source: European Central Bank (2000, p. 42). 
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Table 7   Herfindahl Index for European Countries Banks’ Assets, 1985-1999 
 
  1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
AT  0.0363 0.0437 0.0445 0.0831 0.0983 0.1016
BE  0.0637 0.0670 0.0700 0.1310 0.1552
DE  0.0112 0.0134 0.0136
DK  0.1211 0.1186 0.1164 0.1337 0.1363
ES  0.0373 0.0352 0.0528 0.0503 0.0496 0.0488 0.0716
FI  0.1786 0.1793 0.1814 0.2041 0.1910
FR  0.0421 0.0437 0.0449 0.0485 0.0509
GR  0.2469 0.2496 0.1778 0.1664 0.1534 0.1539 0.1513
IE  0.0650 0.0580 0.0500 0.0470 0.0480
IT  0.0161 0.0140 0.0313 0.0308 0.0409 0.0600
LU  0.0202 0.0224 0.0237
NL  0.134 0.1169 0.1603 0.1536 0.1654 0.1802 0.1700
PT  0.1118 0.0960 0.1397 0.1491 0.1299 0.1307 0.1234
SE  0.196 0.2250 0.1950 0.2000 0.2040 0.2010 0.1951
UK  0.0156 0.0194 0.0191 0.0206 0.0207 0.0216 0.0263
Average 0.1082 0.0991 0.1049 0.0986 0.0887 0.0984 0.1012
 






















266  Roberto J. Santillán Salgado 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2011, 2, pp. 245-266 
Table 8   Large Financial Institutions Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in the European Union, 
until 2007 
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Source: Own elaboration with data from annual reports, journal articles and internet references.  
 
 